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Policy-makers frequently invoked children's interests as they debated
welfare reform in the 1990s, yet they did not all agree on what should be done to
improve children's well-being. This Article argues that the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act contained three policy
theories that identified different goals and policy interventions in order to
improve children's lives. Moreover, because the Act gives states considerable
discretion to fashion their own programs, what happens to these different
approaches depends on what the states do as they develop their own programs
and implement the 1996 welfare reform.
The authors' analysis of state programs indicates that states are creating
welfare systems that depend primarily on the idea that children's lives will
improve when they have a working parent, irrespective of whether this
employment increases family incomes. Further, this Article argues that although
states have expanded their funding for work support services, particularly child
care, they have placed much less emphasis on ensuring that families with an
employed head of household have greater resources. Finally, this Article claims
that states have done little to promote changes in family structure, even though
the preamble to the Personal Responsibility Act emphasizes the importance of
marriage for children 's well-being.
I. INTRODUCTION
Children's interests were frequently invoked during the congressional debate
of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(Personal Responsibility Act). Those who supported the Personal Responsibility
Act, those who wanted to amend it, and those who opposed it all argued that they
were the ones who knew what was best for children. Yet these legislators did not
share a common understanding of children's interests. Behind these various
claims rested different ideas about what children needed and how public policy
could improve children's lives, and the adoption of the Personal Responsibility
Act did not resolve these competing visions.
The Personal Responsibility Act itself reflects several distinct ideas about
what is best for children. For example, the preamble promotes marriage and the
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need to raise children in two-parent families. The body of the Personal
Responsibility Act, however, advances a program aimed at moving single
mothers into paid employment, justified at least partly on the grounds that
children fare better when they have a working parent Supporters of the Personal
Responsibility Act, frying to deflect opponents' criticisms that the time limits
and block grant provisions would further impoverish children, claimed that
children's material needs would still be met and that the states could protect this
vulnerable group just as well as the federal government.1
What happens to these different approaches to children's well-being depends
on what the states do as they develop their own programs and implement the
requirements of the Personal Responsibility Act. Because the Act repealed the
federal entitlement program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
and put in its place a block grant structure, states now have a great deal of leeway
to fashion their own programs; they are invited to experiment with innovative
policies. Creativity and resourcefulness within the states could lead to a myriad
of policies and a host of connections among them, resulting in a complex array
of policy approaches to children's well-being. And as states experiment with new
methods, a dominant policy approach might emerge as they quickly discern and
follow the best of each other's innovations. Yet states have also been known to
be reluctant and conservative innovators; they might also end up with welfare
programs and administrative systems that do little more than meet federal
requirements with the greatest ease.
Therefore, this paper asks the question: how have the states addressed the
interests of children in their welfare reforms, not just in their formal policies, but
also in the ways they implement those policies in their management or
administrative systems? The paper draws on field research conducted for the
Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government (hereinafter Rockefeller
Institute). Nineteen research teams, one in each state included in the study,
collected data at the state level, as well as through visits to two local welfare
offices in each state, on the institutional changes wrought by welfare reform--on
the ways in which states have organized or reorganized their management
systems--often encompassing a vast number and variety of public and private
institutions, for carrying out their welfare programs.
We use this data on state and institutional behavior to determine the policy
theories that are being enacted in the day-to-day operations of state and local
welfare systems. By policy theories, we mean the explicit--or more often,
implicit--set of postulated causal connections between policies and desirable
outcomes. We consider what kinds of services are provided, in what sequence, to
which persons, and to what apparent ends. By examining the services delivered,
I See Robert Pear, Governors Agree Children Must Be Protected No Matter What Shape
Welfare Takes, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1995, at A19.
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the kinds of organizations and workers who deliver them, the criteria for
performance embedded in contracts and funding formulas, and the kinds of
information collected and used, we can begin to discern what these new welfare
systems are organized to do-and by the same token, what they do not seem to
be doing at all.
We see the Personal Responsibility Act as containing three major
approaches to children's well-being-three policy theories that relate program
activities to the interests of children: (1) the family structure theory contends that
children benefit from being born only to families who are able to care for them,
specifically, not to unmarried couples or teens, and that teen and unmarried
women should not have families; (2) the resource theory holds that children
benefit from increased resources, such as income obtained as caregivers enter
and progress in the workforce; and (3) the environment theory maintains that
children reap psychological and sociological benefits from being part of a family
environment in which the head of the household works.
Although the Personal Responsibility Act includes elements of all three of
these policy theories, our research finds that states are creating welfare systems
that depend for the most part on the third policy theory, in which the simple fact
of working is expected to create a more structured, better functioning home
environment. States have placed less emphasis in their management systems on
enacting the models involving family structure and resources. Important
exceptions exist, but in most states, to the extent that children are expected to
gain from welfare reform, the gains are presumed to come from connections
between workforce participation by caregivers, usually mothers, and the
sociological and psychological environments experienced by their children.
However, the implementation of the environment theory is, in many ways,
incomplete. States are generally succeeding in creating strong program signals
and incentives for mothers to minimize dependence on welfare by finding
work-usually unsubsidized jobs-and staying in the workforce, even if having
a job has little positive impact on their total household income. And although
many problems still exist, states are doing a better job in providing work support
services, particularly child care, with the potential of having a major impact on
the environment in which children are raised.
Yet state welfare systems are leaving many of the putative connections
between workforce participation by mothers and child well-being as just that-
more assumed than known. These connections assume that particular things will
happen in the daily lives of children: that their days will be more structured
rather than chaotic; that they will have stable child care and established routines
rather than an unreliable patchwork of caregivers; and that they will see and
realize a relationship between hard work and achievement rather than hard work
that is unrecognized and not rewarded. States have done little to examine
1999] 1329
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNVAL
whether in fact these things actually happen. Moreover, what little research has
been done on these interconnections suggests that many of them are interactive:
they depend on many other factors, such as the psychological well-being of the
mother, and cannot be assumed to work out the same way in all situations.2
The incomplete implementation of policy theories linking welfare reform
and children's interests raises problems that are compounded by an important
characteristic of the new welfare. That is, significant costs are imposed on
children whose parents fail to respond to incentives and sanctions in the desired
way. Children who may be harmed as a necessary component of the reforms, not
as an unforeseen side-effect include: children who are conceived and born
despite the incentives not to have them; children whose parents fail to show up at
orientation meetings, look for work seriously, or follow through on their personal
responsibility agreements; and children whose parents fail to gain financial
independence before the time limits are up. These penalties and costs are integral
to the policy theories that lie behind the new programs' attempts to change
behavior and increase overall work participation rates.3
In Part II of this paper, we explicate the three policy theories concerning
welfare and children's well-being included in the Personal Responsibility Act.
Then in Part II, we examine the states' choices as they develop their welfare
programs. In Part IV, we demonstrate that the states have taken little action to
pursue policies consistent with the family structure theory and have instead
thrown their energies into implementing work first programs. Work oriented
programs could mesh with either the resource theory or the environment theory,
but we find that states have done little to implement the resource theory and their
work programs resonate more with the environment theory.
II. POLICY THEORIES AND THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT
A. First Comes Love, Then Comes Marriage: The Family Structure Theory
To better understand the first policy theory, the family structure theory, one
may begin by reading the preamble to the Personal Responsibility Act, which
2 See generally Toby L. Parcel & Elizabeth G. Menaghan, Effects of Low-Wage
Employment on Family Well-Being, FUTURE CHILDREN, Spring 1997, at 116, 116-21; Martha
J. Zaslow & Carol A. Emig, When Low-Income Mothers Go to Work" Implications for
Children, FUTURE CHELDREN, Spring 1997, at 110, 110-15.
3 U.S. social policy has long rested on dividing the poor into groups with different
assistance programs for each group and different degrees of assistance based on expectations
about the ability of individuals in each group to work and support themselves. See generally
JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY, 1900-1994 (1994)
(discussing these divisions and the associated policies).
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opens with a congressional finding that "marriage is the foundation of a
successful society."4 Marriage is an "essential institution" for the promotion of
children's interests, Congress continued, and children require "responsible
fatherhood and motherhood" for a successful upbringing.5 These statements
underscore the belief that children's well-being is protected and advanced most
when children are raised in two-parent families. Indeed, Congress continued the
preamble with a detailed account of the problems encountered by children raised
in single-parent homes: they are more likely to receive public assistance and to
receive it for longer periods of time; they are more likely to have problems in
school and lower educational achievements; they are more likely to be involved
with the juvenile justice system and to live in neighborhoods with higher crime
rates; and they are more likely to grow up to be adults who are poor, do not
marry, and receive welfare.6
The preamble reflects the fact that, for many legislators, the key to
improving children's lives is to alter the structure of families by reducing out-of-
wedlock births and promoting marriage. For example, in congressional hearings,
Representative James Talent (R. Mo.) professed that "the growth in illegitimacy
is the single most important change in our country in the last generation. It is a
fact so powerful that it annihilates all other facts.'7 Representative Clay Shaw
(R. Fla.) explained that the best way to fight poverty was to encourage marriage
and discourage out-of-wedlock births.8 Representative Tim Hutchinson (R. Ark.)
echoed this thought with, "it may take a village, but it sure takes a father" to raise
children successfully.9 For these legislators, what children need most is to be
raised in a two-parent family. The primary problem is single-parent families, not
poverty, welfare receipt, school failure, or juvenile delinquency. These are
secondary problems that would wane if only children were born and raised
within the institution of marriage.
Advocates of the family structure theory argue that "you get what you pay
for," and AFDC paid for and promoted single motherhood.10 They believe that
4 42 U.S.C. § 601 note (Supp. 1111997) (citing Pub. L. No. 104-193 § 101 (1996)).
5 1d.
6 See id.
7 Causes of Poverty, with a Focus on Out-of-Wedlock Births: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Ways & Means Comm., 104th Cong. 20 (1996).
8 See id at 4.
9Id at 12.
10 This argument about AFDC has been made by many people in many places. See David
Popenoe, Family Caps, SOCIErY, July-Aug. 1996, at 25, 25-27; see generally CHARLES
MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL PoLICY, 1950-1980 (1984). To place current
ideological views of poverty and welfare in a broader historical context, see generally
PATrERSON, supra note 3.
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withdrawing public assistance from single mothers--or making the assistance
less attractive-would hinder the formation of single-parent families by
encouraging women to forego childbearing, or marry before or during
pregnancy. Congressional adherents of this view pushed for federal provisions
requiring states to impose family caps and deny aid to unwed teen mothers and
their children. 1  They were unsuccessful in imposing such federal mandates, but
they were able to include in the Act provisions allowing states to adopt these
measures. The Act also requires states ta demand that teen mothers live at home
and attend school in order to receive public assistance. 12
The Act also allows states to pursue additional policy tools aimed at
promoting marriage. These include granting aid to two-parent families, based on
the idea that aid provided only to single-parent families encourages families to
break apart, and implementing employment and training programs for men,
based on the idea that men will not many if they do not have adequate jobs.13
Such proposals received little attention in congressional discussions about
welfare reform, although the block grant provisions now give states the latitude
to experiment with these alternatives if they so choose.
B. Work and the Personal Responsibility Act: The Resource Theory
Although the preamble to the Personal Responsibility Act reflects the first
policy theory by highlighting the need to promote marriage and reduce out-of-
wedlock births, the stipulations of the Act itself focus on moving welfare
recipients into the workplace and off the welfare rolls. Through time limits and
11 See Jeffrey L. Katz, House GOP Welfare Plan Shifts Focus from Work to Teen
Mothers, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., 160, 160-61 (1995).
12 Requiring teen mothers to live at home and attend school in order to receive public
assistance is an indirect way to prevent teen births. It rests on the assumption that teens will be
less likely to have children if they cannot establish independent households. It may also rest on
the assumption that teen mothers will be less likely to have additional children because they
will receive greater supervision living at home; this may well be a faulty assumption because
these teens probably lived at home when they first became pregnant Alternative reasons to
support this requirement for teen mothers have little to do with prevention theory and rely
instead on ideas that teen mothers will be better single parents if they have assistance from their
extended family and will be more capable of supporting themselves if they finish high school.
13 The argument that AFDC should be granted to two-parent families in order to prevent
families from breaking up was made by President Kennedy when he proposed AFDC-UP in
1961. See Special Message to the Congress: Program for Economic Recovery and Growth,
PUB. PAPERS 41, 46-47 (Feb. 2, 1961), reprinted in 17 CoNG. Q. ALMANAC 861, 863 (1961).
For an example of a more recent version of this argument, see FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL,
FREE TO BE FAMILY 39-44 (1992). The argument that two-parent families do not form because
men lack adequate jobs has been advanced by William Julius Wilson. THE TRULY
DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987).
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work requirements, the Act emphasizes the importance of paid employment by
single mothers. 14 Republicans as well as many Democrats lauded the
replacement of AFDC, a program adopted to enable mothers to stay home with
their children, with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), a program
providing only temporary aid with the expectation that mothers would support
their families through paid employment 15 When President Clinton signed the
Personal Responsibility Act, he praised it for being "tough on work," 16 and for
correcting deficiencies in earlier versions of the legislation, 17 which he
characterized as "soft on work."18
While the Act distinctly demands greater emphasis on paid employment, it
does not present any one particular reason for moving women on welfare into the
workforce. There can be many justifications for an increased emphasis on paid
employment. One argument linking these policy changes to children's interests
was that employed parents-typically, mothers-would promote child well-
being. Policy-makers have been somewhat vague about the particular aspects of
child well-being they thought would improve if parents moved from welfare to
work, but generally their expectations fall into two categories, either the resource
model, or the environment theory.
Proponents of the resource theory argue that work improves children's
material well-being; employment brings with it higher incomes that are used to
purchase the things children need. Support for the idea that paid employment
makes one better off than when receiving public assistance is apparent in the
Clinton administration's phrase "make work pay."19 Clinton reiterated this
14 The Act requires states to impose work requirements after women have received
welfare for two years, although states can impose these requirements earlier if they so choose.
The Act also adopts a five-year lifetime limit on the receipt of cash assistance under TANF. If
states provide cash assistance for longer than five years, they can use only state funding for that
aid. For a summary of the Act's major provisions, see generally Welfare Overhaul Highlights,
52 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 6-13 to 6-21(1996).
15 For an account of the politics of the Personal Responsibility Act, see generally GARY
BRYNER, POLmCS AND PUBLIC MORALITY: THE GREAT AMERICAN WELFARE REFORM DEBATE
(1998).
16Statement on Signing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996,2 PuB. PAPERs 1328, 1328 (Aug. 22, 1998) [hereinafter Signing].
17 See id. 1328-29; see also Remarks on Signing the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 and an Exchange with Reporters, 2 PuB. PAPERS 1325,
1325-26 (Aug. 22, 1998) [hereinafter Remarks on Signing]; Remarks on Welfare Reform
Legislation and an Exchange with Reporters 2 PUB. PAPERS 1233, 1234 (July 31, 1996)
[hereinafter Remarks on Welfare].
18 See Remarks on Welfare, supra note 17 at 1234.
19 See generally MARY Jo BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE REALrrIES: FROM
RHETORIC TO REFORM (1994) (discussing the "make work pay" concept and the policies they
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sentiment when he signed the Act explaining that "[t]he best antipoverty
program is still a job."20 This approach to child well-being requires not only that
mothers get jobs that pay at least as much as they might receive in cash
assistance and Food Stamps lost as their earnings increase, but also that they
receive adequate support services, such as child care and transportation
assistance, to make up for the increased costs of going to work. Some advocates
of this theory also emphasize the need for education and training, so that women
can obtain higher-paying jobs.2' Others suggest various forms of wage
supplements,22 assuming that adults with little work experience and few skills
are unlikely to acquire such positions.
C. Work and the Iersonal Responsibility Act: The Environment Theory
This resources model, however, is not the only argument in favor of work-
based reforms. Policy-inakers rarely rely only on material wealth to champion
work as a host of studies document the difficulty of raising substantially the
incomes of poor men and women through employment alone.23 Downplaying
increased income as a central goal of work, many policy advocates instead see
work as an activity that changes people for the better. When this view of work is
applied to child well-being, it forms the crux of the third theory, the environment
theory.
Adherents of the environment theory emphasize the need to improve the
nature of children's upbringing and present work as the key to this
transformation. In this third policy theory, an employed parent is supposed to be
a better parent one who through her own employment transmits to her children
the psychological benefits of higher self-esteem and confidence as well as the
development of discipline, structure, and hard work needed to fulfill the role of a
good worker.24 During the congressional debate on welfare reform, for example,
advocate to fulfill this goal).
20 Signing, supra note 16, at 1329.
2 1 See MICHAEL S. DUKAKIS & ROsABETH Moss KANTER, CREATING THE FUTURE: THE
MASSACHUSETTS COMEBACK AND IT'S PROMISE FOR AMERICA 107 (1988). This was an
important element of the Family Support Act of 1988. See Lloyd Bentsen, Reforming the
Welfare System: The Family Support Act of1988, J. LEGIS. 133, 133-40 (1990).
22 See, e.g., Gary T. Burtless, Welfare Recipients 'Job Sllls and Employment Prospects,
FUTURE CHILDREN, Spring 1997, at 39, 39-51.
23 See BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 19, at 56. See generally REBECCA M. BLANK,
IT TAKES A NATION: A NEW AGENDA FOR FIGHTING POVERTY (1997); KATHRYN EDIN &
LAURA LEN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-
WAGE WORK (1997); JUDITHM. GUERONETAL., FROM WELFARETO WORK (1991).
24 Presenting the psychological and sociological benefits of work is an important part of
politicians' defense of work programs. For example, when President Clinton signed the
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Representative Ensign proclaimed, "I grew up with a single mom.... And I
watched my mom get up every day and go to work. That is what we need in this
country is to have children watching their parents go to work on a daily basis."25
Parents who worked would be more responsible, more disciplined, and more
structured; they would expose their children to the world of work and the
characteristics needed to survive in it. Work would "give children of this country
an opportunity and incentive to enjoy the American dream, to get off the welfare
system, to know what the free enterprise system is about."26
In the environment theory, increased earnings obtained through employment
are good but not a necessary aspect of the policy theory. Work is salutary even if
it does not lead to upward mobility because of the beneficial effect it has on the
behavior and attitudes of mothers and their children.27 Consequently, the
environment theory places little emphasis on education and training, or various
ways to supplement and increase the earnings of low-income workers. What is
important is that women receiving welfare go to work and get off the rolls; how
much they earn or their prospects of advancement are not important.
One support service that is critical to the environment theory, however, is
child care. At least implicit in the theory is the idea that poor mothers receiving
welfare may not be very good mothers, and that their children will be better off if
the mothers go to work and the children receive alternative care.28 All adherents
of the environment theory recognize that children have to be cared for by
someone while their mothers are at work. They differ, though, in how much
emphasis they place on high quality child care in order to achieve the desired
improvements in children's upbringing. Some adherents of this theory believe so
passionately in the transformative value of work that they do not place much
importance on the quality of care received by these children.29 Others emphasize
the need for quality care that provides better developmental opportunities for
Personal Responsibility Act, he relayed a conversation he had with a woman named Lillie
Harden who had been on welfare and then got off. "I said, 'Lillie, what's the best thing about
being off welfare?' And she looked me straight in the eye and said, 'When my boy goes to
school and they say what does your mama do for a living, he can give an answer."' Remarks
on Signing, supra note 17, at 1325. See generally DUKAKIS & KANTER, supra note 21, at
107-33.
25 141 CONG. REC. H3362, H3363 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Rep. Ensign).
26 Id at H3348 (statement of Representative Manzullo).
27 See Lawrence M. Mead, Welfare Reform at Work SocIETY, July-Aug. 1996, at 37,
37-40.
28 See generally Cathy M. Johnson, Welfare and Work: What Happened to Feminist
Perspectives? (Apr. 23-25, 1998) (unpublished manuscript presented at the annual meeting of
the Midwest Political Science Association, on file with authors).
29 See generally LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICs OF POVERTY: ThE NON-
WORKING POOR IN AMERICA (1992).
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poor children.30
1II. STATE CHOICES AND POLICY THEORIES
A. Rejecting Family Structure Theory
As the legislative debate moved out of the Congress and into the states, there
was an important change in the focus of the reforms. While the preamble to the
federal legislation expressed an urgent need to reduce teen and out-of-wedlock
births and promote marriage as the keys to children's interests, states have placed
much less emphasis on these goals in designing their new welfare programs,
particularly when compared to their strong focus on work. Now that states have
considerable power to design their welfare programs, there are important
variations from state to state and even within some states. But generally, the
states have written laws, constructed management systems, and allocated
resources around the task of moving parents into the workforce. By and large, the
states have rejected the family structure theory; they have not focused on
changing marital or reproductive behavior.
One reason for the winnowing out of explicit measures to alter reproductive
and marital decisions is the greater controversy surrounding proposals relating to
family structure. Usually, some support for a proposal targeting family formation
could be found, but typically no one approach commanded majority support.
Even in relatively progressive states such as Washington, early welfare reform
bills emphasized not just time limits but also denial of welfare benefits to
unmarried teen mothers and family caps. Yet these latter provisions were
eventually jettisoned as later legislative proposals focused instead on moving
adults into the workforce.
Proposals with a central focus on family structure were also replaced by
work-oriented legislation in politically conservative states. The early (1992)
welfare reform bill in Mississippi, designated by its main proponent as a "pro-
family" bill, included proposals to implant "female AFDC recipients with four or
more children with the birth control drug Norplant," impose a family cap, and
offer "a thousand dollar 'reward' to women who married and left the rolls. '31
30 This is sometimes referred to as a two-generation approach to poverty. Reducing
poverty through enriched child development programs was a central justification of Head
Start's inclusion in the Johnson Administration's War on Poverty. See generally LYNDA J.
AMES & JEANNE ELLSWORTH, WOMEN REFORMED, WOMEN EMPOWERED: POOR MOTHERS
AND THE ENDANGERED PROMISE OF HEAD START (1997). For a broader discussion of the
politics of child care and welfare, see generally MARY FRANCEs BERRY, THE POLmcS OF
PARENTHOOD (1993).
3 1 THENELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF GOv'T, MISSISSIPPI FIELD RESEARCH REPORT 3
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State Senator Gunm said the primary intent of the bill was 'to restore sanctity to
the family and dignity to the individual.' 32 But there Was strong opposition
from the State Legislature's Black Caucus and a variety of advocacy groups,
including religious organizations. The bill eventually died after the chair of the
House Appropriations Committee refused to consider it, saying that he "didn't
want to put the House through the misery of debating this bill."33
Ultimately, the new proposal focused instead on work and self-sufficiency,
with an emphasis on immediate attachment to the workforce. The final program
retained the family cap; the governors' comments justifying it invoked the family
structure theory when Governor Fordice argued that because the cap would
prevent births to teen mothers, it would reduce "the continual production of
children that nobody seems to want to take responsibility for raising," and that
the policy would get "right to the root cause of crime in Mississippi. '34 But other
than the cap, no specific program of services to prevent out-of-wedlock
pregnancies was adopted. With the strong work orientation, the bill was still
criticized by advocates, but the final vote in the legislature "bordered on
unanimity. '35
Other states have created new disincentives for teens or unmarried women-
and to a lesser extent, men-to have additional children, and thus reflect some
aspects of the family structure theory. Family caps, in a strict sense, exist in
eighteen states: sixteen states deny all support to children born or presumably
conceived while on welfare, and two states, Wisconsin and Utah, offer only flat
grants that do not adjust to family size. Another five states reduce grants to
additional children or require the grants to be provided to third parties or in the
form of vouchers.36 The geographical pattern of family caps, however, tends to
reduce their potential effect. Strict family caps are mostly found in the South and
West, in states that do not have high benefit levels, so the financial disincentive
tends to be small. In Mississippi, for example, each child adds only $24 per
month to a household's AFDC/TANF benefits if the state's family cap does not
apply.37
While the federal law gave states the authority to decide whether they would
have family caps, it requires that teens live at their parent's home, if they want to
(1998).
32 Id at 4.
33 Id. at 5.
34 Id. at 9.
35 d at 13.
36 See generally SHELLEY STARK & JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN, EXCLUDED CHILDREN: FAMILY
CAPS IN ANEW ERA (1999).
37 See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 105TH CONG.,
1998 GREEN BOOK419 tbl.7-A (1998) (Comm. Print 1998).
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receive benefits for themselves and their children.38 Other than complying with
this federal requirement, states have done little to target teen births. States have
not emphasized services or programs that are explicitly designed to reduce teen
birth rates through their welfare program. No states are picking up on one of the
major initiatives pushed in the U.S. House of Representatives by proponents of
the family structure theory, the option to deny aid outright to unwed teen
mothers.
While there may be consensus on the wisdom and desirability of preventing
pregnancies among teens and unmarried couples, there is no consensus on how
to do it. The basic divide is between abstinence education, and comprehensive
sex education which includes the discussion, and possibly the distribution, of
contraceptives. Because of the difficulty in reconciling these divergent
approaches to pregnancy prevention, a common response by the states is to
create fairly unspecific, poorly funded programs and devolve all the
controversial decisions to local governments and agencies. 39 Indeed, when
compared to other welfare functions, such as employment services and cash
assistance, states are more likely to pass decision making authority over
pregnancy prevention down to local governments and institutions, and are less
likely to exert state-level control over the delivery of services, the design of
administrative processes, and even the adoption of basic policies.40 And where
state control is exercised, it is sometimes intended to restrict what can be done,
not to encourage local offices to do more. In Utah, for example, front-line
workers are prohibited from discussing birth control options with welfare
recipients. Finally, field research at local welfare offices in other states suggests
that many front-line workers simply do not feel that it is appropriate to discuss
personal issues with clients. As one New York City official commented to our
field researcher, '"Ninety percent of our workers are themselves single parents
and identify on that point with their clients."41
Thus, aside from family caps-which are easy to administer, and which save
rather than cost states money-the states have done relatively little to change
38 Teens may be exempt from this requirement if they can demonstrate that living at home
would not be safe. See generally JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN, CTR. FOR LAW & Soc. POLICY, TEEN
PARENT PROvIsIONS IN THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTLNiTY
RECONCiLiATONACrOF 1996 (1996).
39 See generally RICHARD NATHAN Er AL., TE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF
GOV'T., Is THME A LINKBETwEEN WELFARE REFORM AND TEEN PREGNANCY? (1999).
40 See id.; see also RiCHARD P. NATHAN & THOMAs L. GAIs, THE NELSON A.
ROCKEFELLER INST. OF GOV'T, IMPLEMENTING THE PERSONAL RESPONSILrnY Acr OF 1996:
A Fisr LOOK 39-42 (1999).
41 Tm NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INsT. OF GOV'T, NEW YORK FIELD RESEARCH
REPORT 22 (1998).
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marital or reproductive behavior. To the extent that they have done anything,
they have given greater attention to preventing births than facilitating marriage.
Unlike family caps which spread quickly to other states, after first adopted in
New Jersey, "bridefare" (cash payments by welfare offices to women receiving
public assistance who marry) has not spread widely, and few other ideas about
encouraging marriage have emerged. Programs that try to increase unmarried
fathers' involvement with their children tend to be spotty, and generally, small in
scope. Because early evaluations show little promise of effectiveness, 42 states
may be reluctant to continue expanding them. States are required by federal law
to make greater efforts to establish paternity and tighten up on child support
enforcement, but these activities are aimed at requiring financial contributions
from non-custodial parents and not at promoting joint parenting of mothers and
fathers. In fact, some analysts believe that these requirements will further
separate children from their fathers. 43
B. Promoting Work First: A New Political Equilibrium
In contrast to the weak implementation of direct measures to influence
family structure, states have placed enormous emphasis on employment goals.
Although state welfare reforms are very diverse, most of the states share a strong
focus on employment, with an emphasis on a "work first! model that seeks to
create an immediate attachment to the workforce. This emphasis on employment
appears in a variety of ways, including changes in legislative politics, agency
responsibilities, the distribution of power between state and local offices, the
types of signals emitted by programs, and the services provided. One of the more
surprising changes in the aftermath of the Personal Responsibility Act, as well as
in the more comprehensive waiver programs, has been the considerable
consensus supporting this new emphasis on work. In most of the states, the new
emphasis on work-specifically, imposing strict and extensive employment
obligations on adult recipients of welfare benefits-has commanded widespread
and often bipartisan political support. As Thomas Kaplan noted in his Wisconsin
field report for this study:
4 2 See generally FRED DOOLTLE Er AL., BUILDING OPPORTUNITIE, ENFORCING
OBLIGATIONS: IMPLEMENTATION AND INTERIM IMPACrS OF PARENTs' FAIR SHARE (1998).
43 See Elaine Sorensen & Robert Lerrnan, Welfare Reform and Low-Income Noncustodial
Fathers, CHALLENGE, July-Aug. 1998, at 101, 101-16.
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A striking feature of this abrupt change in approach toward AFDC has been the
apparent breadth of acceptance of that change in the state. From the governor's
first proposals to reduce AFDC benefits in families with teens not attending
school (Learnfare), many (though by no means all) representatives of the inner
city poor in Milwaukee have endorsed the changes. Wisconsin's Democrats
were the initial proponents of 'ending welfare as we know it' in this state, and
very little opposition has arisen to the requirement of W-2 that public assistance
cash income must derive only from participation in work or work-like programs
44
The story was similar in most other states. Although partisan fights erupted
in some states and on some issues, those divisions were more the exception than
the rule. The most contentious issue in many states was not so much over the
substance of welfare reform as over who would control or administer the
program. In North Carolina, for example, the most contentious issue was over
the autonomy and flexibility to be accorded to counties in operating the reforms,
an issue that was also at the center of the debate in California. The most divisive
question in Arizona was privatization-whether administration of welfare
functions such as cash assistance and job training should be given to private
organizations. In many states, a major issue concerned which state agency or
agencies would have program responsibilities over welfare reforms--that is,
whether labor or employment bureaucracies should have a major role in welfare
reform, or whether large social service bureaucracies should continue to exert
more or less exclusive control over welfare.
In some states this widespread emphasis on work displaced other emerging
program orientations, some of which included a more direct emphasis on child
well-being. In North Carolina, for example, comprehensive social service reform
could be traced back to Governor James B. Hunt's 1992 campaign for reelection,
but his original focus was on children's issues, especially pre-school age
concerns, such as day care, pre-school education, child health and development
and support services for families. The resulting "Smart Stare' demonstration
program emphasized devolution to local governments and public-private
partnerships. But after Republican gains in the state's legislature in 1994,
Governor Hunt launched a work first program by executive order, a program that
was later described as a "comprehensive, statewide approach to moving families
from welfare to work" with little emphasis on direct services to children.45
But the political allure of the work first approach was strong, and it showed
44 THE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF GOV'T, WISCONsIN FIELD RESEARCH REPORT 9
(1998).




some promise of establishing a widely accepted mission that AFDC had long
lacked. Indeed, work seemed to be an equilibrium point for creating majority
coalitions. In conservative states, provisions that emphasized antifraud and
extreme measures relating to reproductive behavior-such as the mandatory
birth control measures introduced in Mississippi-often failed to garner majority
support, while the work-related provisions survived. While in a liberal state such
as Rhode Island, entitlements survived but were conditioned by work
requirements as the legislation was modified to secure broader support. In the
end, work could be seen as both a responsibility that conditions benefits, as well
as an opportunity to pull families out of financial dependence on public
assistance; its protean character produced a new and widely shared mission
under the new block grant.
Work requirements in legislation are not new to welfare, but earlier
provisions had little effect on welfare because they applied to few recipients and
were poorly implemented. 46 In contrast, our field research on the early stages of
the implementation of the Personal Responsibility Act shows that its work
requirements are being translated into major changes in the institutions of
welfare.47 There may be several reasons why so many real administrative and
institutional changes are occurring in this round of welfare reform. Unlike the
years after the enactment of the Family Support Act of 1988, when the nation
went into a moderate recession, the strong economy of the middle and late 1990s
helps to reduce caseloads, increases the amount of money available for services,
and gives welfare administrators and workers confidence that even clients with
weak skills can find jobs. Gerald Miller, the former secretary of Michigan's
Department of Social Services and the architect of its welfare reforms, "told
audiences that one thing that drove his support for welfare reform was the fact
that employers kept coming to him to try and get employees. '48
The federal time limits on assistance also got the attention of states and
localities. States, counties, and cities realized that if families fail to achieve
financial independence, before the lifetime limits on assistance come into play,
they may have to absorb the full costs of assisting these families-or face the
potential political fallout of seeing large numbers of destitute families with
children. Even politically moderate local governments, such as Hennepin County
in Minnesota, pushed hard for strong welfare reforms, because they felt that they
may be forced to use local property tax revenues to provide for poor families
46 See generally PAT1ERSON, supra note 3; BRYNER, supra note 15.
47 See generally NATHAN & GAIS, supra note 40.




after they hit the time limits.49 Another critical factor may be the fact that
governors learned that welfare reform was no longer a political quagmire, as
several of them, particularly in the Midwest, championed welfare innovations
through AFDC waivers and saw significant political payoffs.50
In any event, federal and state welfare reforms have produced significant
changes, not just in the laws, but just as importantly, in the vast administrative
systems that carry out the day-to-day work of welfare. Perhaps the strongest
program changes to date may be found in the signals emitted by programs-that
is, the messages that are delivered at different levels of the welfare system. New
signals are found in names. For example, agencies are now job centers, instead of
welfare centers, and front-line workers have new job titles. There are signals in
the application process as well; orientations and job search information come
early in the process. These new signals put a much greater emphasis on work and
using options other than public assistance to deal with financial crises.
Additionally, more resources are available to support work activities, particularly
child care. Several of these changes, including characteristics of these new
programs and their delivery systems, are particularly important in understanding
how children's interests are treated under the new welfare. The most important
changes are discussed infra.51
1. New Institutions
Many of the new signals are expressed to families through the new
institutions and processes of welfare. As mentioned above, one of the
characteristics of this round of welfare reform is the willingness of legislators
and governors to adopt new institutional structures to carry out the reforms.
Program signals are being changed, at least in part, through who communicates
the signals. In the past, most-if not all--signals received by welfare applicants
and clients were emitted by a social service agency. Now, employment, labor, or
workforce development bureaucracies have been given greater control over the
design and operation of welfare programs, and their involvement sends new
signals to applicants and clients. In some cases, such as Utah and Wisconsin, the
entire program is operated under workforce development agencies. More
typically, labor or employment bureaucracies share control with social service
agencies over the new welfare. In a few states, welfare offices have been
49 See generally THE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF GOV'T, MINNESOTA FIELD
RESEARCH REPORT (1998).
50 For discussions of several of these governors, see generally LEARNING FROM THE
LEADERS: How FIVE MIDWESTERN STATES REFORMED WELFARE (Carol Weissert, ed.)
(forthcoming 2000).
51 For a more extensive discussion of these points see NATHAN & GAIS, supra note 40.
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incorporated into local job centers, thereby making welfare just one form of
assistance for people who are looking for jobs-and who are expected to be
looking for jobs. States that involve both their social service agencies and
employment agencies in the new welfare systems are using a variety of
processes, client mandates, physical facilities-such as full-service job centers-
and structures for case management-such as teams or new positions that have
holistic responsibilities for a family-in order to reduce the "hand-off' problem
of having people move from eligibility specialists to job services. For example,
in Georgia, applicants for public assistance must register for a job search before
their applications can be approved.
2. New Processes and Treatments
States are also sending new signals to clients by adding new treatments and
activities and by rearranging the processes by which families are handled. Most
local welfare offices have a greatly expanded repertoire of program tools-i.e.,
treatments they can apply to families-especially activities or requirements used
at the point of program entry. In the past, welfare offices focused very intently on
determining if a client was eligible for cash assistance or other federal
entitlements such as Medicaid, often at the exclusion of any other task.52 Now,
rather than reviewing clients' eligibility for cash assistance and other benefits
after they first enter a welfare office, most states and local offices have
developed other steps that may lead families to forgo applying for welfare, or
that may even prevent an application from being approved. New Jersey, for
example, redesigned its intake process to require families to cooperate in getting
child support, before they can apply for assistance. Many states have
requirements that clients seek jobs while their applications for assistance are
under review. Most states have also developed diversion programs, programs
intended to deal with clients who do not need continuing assistance. Some of
these diversion programs are formal programs with short-term, often one-time,
benefits that help a family get over a temporary crisis, such as money to fix a car
needed to go to work. Yet the function of diversion involves a wide range of
activities. Texas sometimes makes referrals to local charitable organizations; and
local welfare offices, in many states, use a wide variety of means to impress on
clients the idea that they should seek support from other sources before applying
for cash assistance. These signals are sometimes conveyed in eligibility
screening interviews, the development of personal responsibility agreements, and
general orientation meetings.
52 See generally BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 19.
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3. Increased Use of Sanctions
Previous work requirements attached to welfare gave states the authority to
sanction families-i.e., reduce benefits or even cut off all benefits to a family-
for noncompliance. But because the work requirements were not implemented
fully, sanctions were not used often. With tougher work requirements under the
Personal Responsibility Act, states are now imposing a greater number of
sanctions on a larger part of the caseload. Most of the sanctions imposed are
partial reductions in benefits. In Minnesota, for example, first sanctions only
reduce benefits by ten percent. However, more states have the authority to
impose full family sanctions, not simply the elimination of benefits to the
offending adult. Sanctions have been especially used to enforce attendance at
orientation meetings, job search, and cooperation with getting child support
orders. As our field researcher in Arizona observes, most of the families hit by
first sanctions-which reduce benefits by twenty-five percent-eventually
comply with the program before a third sanction can be imposed-which would
cut off benefits completely.53
4. Expanded Work Support Services
States are also expanding the range and availability of services in support of
work activities, especially child care. The new program signals that mothers
ought to look for work are combined, in most states, with increased resources for
child care, job search, transportation, and other services in direct support of
work. States offered these support services before the adoption of the Personal
Responsibility Act, but they are now committing more resources to them as they
have become more focused on moving women receiving public assistance into
the workforce.
Perhaps the greatest change has been the dramatic increase in resources for
child care. TANF and state welfare reforms have created new political dynamics
in support of greater child care funding.54 With attention centered on moving
5 3 See generally JOHN STUART HALL & GERALD J. KuBIAK, ROCKEFELLER REPORT:
ARIZONA'S WELFARE REFORM EXPERIENCE (forthcoming 1999). But it should be mentioned
that data on sanctions are difficult to get and hard to interpret. For example, it is very difficult to
determine in most states whether sanctions are imposed because parents refuse to cooperate
with work requirements, or whether they result from a failure to provide documents or other
information needed for the re-certification of the family's eligibility.
54 The popularity of child care benefits for welfare mothers contrasts sharply with the still
strong political forces against child care services, an opposition based on the belief that mothers
should be home with their children. This sort of opposition killed a child care initiative in 1971
and altered substantially the Child Care and Development Block Grant in 1988. Even as
recently as 1998, United States House of Representatives ignored the Clinton administration's
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recipients into jobs and off the rolls, elected officials are motivated to eliminate
barriers to employment, and the need for child care to enable single mothers to
work is an easily, recognized barrier-perhaps one that is perceived to be more
readily removed than other obstacles such as minimal job skills or substance
abuse problems. Moreover, in some states, child care interest groups have
organized as advocates, effectively pushing a solution-more child care
funding-to a nagging problem-expediting employment by mothers.
In many states, governors have pushed for substantial expansions of child
care programs serving welfare recipients, and political parties have even
competed to claim credit for increased funding for child care. For example, in
Washington, the governor was steadfast in emphasizing the importance of child
care to the success of welfare reform, and state funding for child care in
1997-1999 was increased by forty-one percent over the previous biennium.55
Georgia increased its spending on subsidized child care for families from $18
million in fiscal year 1991 to $143 million in fiscal year 1999, including an
increasing proportion going to families not on welfare, but in transition from
welfare or otherwise with limited incomes.5 6 Wisconsin also added substantial
new resources for child care. As part of Wisconsin Works, also known as W-2,
the state adopted child care assistance for families below 200% of the federal
poverty line and collapsed five categorical programs, some with long waiting
lists, to one program with one set of benefits and co-payments. Over a period of
two years, the state doubled the annual funds available for child care, increasing
them to $180 million in 1998-1999 from $90 million in 1996-1997. Georgia,
Florida, North Carolina, and other states made substantial increases in the funds
available for child care.57
child care initiative, while passing a resolution lauding parents who stayed home to care for
their children. See generally Sue Kirchhoff, House Bill Supports At-Home Parents, 56 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. 396 (1998).
55 See Janet Looney & Betty Jane Narver, Meeting the Goals of Washington's Work First
Program: Key Policy Challenges, in THE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INSnTUTE OF GOV'T,
MANAGING WELFARE REFORM 38,38 (1999).
56 See, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, STATE OF GA., BUDGET REPORT-FISCAL YEAR 2000,
at 259, available in <http:/wvww.state. ga.us/services/leg/2000budget/deptsum/pg259.html>
(visited Dec. 7, 1999) (discussing the "amount of money Georgia spends on subsidized child
care").
57 Nonetheless, waiting lists for child care have not disappeared in all of these states, and
in some cases, those lists have grown. One reason for this continued competition for slots is the
fact that states have been expanding the range of working families eligible for child care
beyond those who are eligible for cash assistance under TANF, in part to reduce any incentives
to remain on welfare for the child care benefits. Yet the number of low income families eligible
for such programs is large, and even relatively generous and prosperous states, such as




Under AFDC, welfare programs were designed at the federal level, and
states administered the program. Under the new block grant structure of TANF,
the federal government has drawn broad guidelines, but has given responsibility
for the program design of welfare services to the states; this process of devolving
decision making power "down" to another level of government is occurring not
only from the federal level to the state level, but also from the state level to local
governments. States are devolving greater responsibilities in conducting and
designing programs down to local governments, contractors, or local offices of
state agencies.
Some of this "second-order" devolution is due to the changing finction of
welfare and the growing role of labor or employment bureaucracies, which have
traditionally been much more decentralized than social service agencies. Because
labor markets as well as the local institutional infrastructure, such as charitable
organizations, vary so much, local variation and flexibility make more sense
under a work first orientation than they did under an entitlement program.
Diversion programs also tend to be highly decentralized, as they often vary
depending on local circumstances. In such cases, the central state offices have
little or no role.
This new decentralization is hardly limited to county-administered states,
such as California and New York, in which county-level government exists and
plays a central role in the administration of welfare. Even in states where there is
not a county government structure, we have found downward shifts in program
responsibility. Thus, states that directly administer a state-wide program and
normally are highly centralized, such as Florida, show increased discretion at the
local level.
C. Preferring the Environment Theory
Most state welfare systems are more complex, devolved, and work-oriented
than they were only a few years ago, and theoretically, work-oriented programs
could be consistent with either the resources theory or the environment theory.
Yet it is the environment theory, not the resources theory, that best fits the
choices that most states and localities have made in translating the new welfare
laws into administrative practices, although there is variation from state to state.
The importance and character of the new program signals, combined with the
relatively spotty progress in connecting TANF with other service systems-
especially entitlements and workforce development programs--imply that low
income families will not be able to combine earnings with public benefits and
services for very long or with much ease. Yet according to most research, this
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combination seems to be critical to raise families with low-skilled wage earners
out of poverty.58
In contrast, welfare systems that reflected the resource theory and were
designed to increase overall family resources would be accepting, even
encouraging, of families who wanted to combine earnings with cash assistance.
This would translate into a strong emphasis on work participation rates for
persons on welfare with little or no emphasis on caseload reduction. These
systems would also limit diversion activities to providing assistance for a job
search and help in dealing with short-term emergencies, but they would not
create unnecessary barriers to program entry. States would also design and
implement eligibility systems that ensure that families who qualify for Food
Stamps, Medicaid, Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and other entitlements
would in fact receive those benefits, if the families want them. States would also
pass through to the families the child support-or at least a large part of it-
collected from non-custodial parents. Such systems would also have fairly
generous income and asset disregards, thereby minimizing the effects that
increased earnings have on the receipt of cash assistance or other benefits. And
the welfare systems would be well-integrated with the state or district's
workforce development system, which would make available to parents the
whole panoply of work services, not just job placement job readiness training,
and other services designed to get people into any job quickly. Finally, data on
earnings-not just work actiities and duration-would be tracked and treated as
significant measures of performance.
This, of course, is a tall order, and no states have all of these characteristics.
But some are closer than others. One state that seems to be striving toward
implementing the resources theory is Michigan. Michigan's Family
Independence Program (FIP) has generous income disregards and no official
diversion program. However, it requires applicants to begin the process of
finding unsubsidized employment-by attending an orientation meeting and
developing a personal responsibility plan-before they can enroll in FIP.59 The
state quickly brings to bear the services and capacities of its workforce
development system to the welfare process. Initial orientation meetings are
jointly sponsored by the state's welfare agency and the local workforce
development agency, and contracts with local employment service agencies
require reporting on average wage at placement as well as the number of
placements and client employment rates after ninety days. Michigan has a well-
funded, generous child care program, which pays all child care costs for welfare
recipients and families in the one-year transition period. The state also pays
58 Seegenerally BLANK, supra note 23; BANE& ELLWOOD, supra note 19.
59 See Carol Weissert, The Politics and Policy of Welfare Reform in Michigan, in
LEARNING FROMTHE LEADERS (forthcoming 1999).
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partial child care costs for families with low incomes who are not on welfare,
with no time limit on assistance. As a result state spending on day care increased
by 400 percent between 1992 and 1998.
The spirit of the system seems to be captured, however, in the Project Zero
program, which offers local welfare systems greater flexibility and resources to
help them reduce to zero the number of target families without earned income.
This was a project with a lot of visibility and personal involvement by Governor
John Engler. Though it began at only six sites, the emphasis on maximizing the
proportion of families with earned income while still on the rolls seemed to send
a strong signal to other local systems that the Administration cared about the
employment of families, not the reduction of caseloads. Supporting this message
is the critical fact that Michigan's welfare reform law has no time limits.
Presumably the state will pay for benefits for families no longer eligible for
TANF cash assistance, after they pass the five-year limit. Thus, the state's
emphasis is not getting off of welfare, but increasing earnings, and if those
earnings are low, combining earnings with cash assistance as well as in-kind
benefits. Perhaps as a result even though Michigan's unemployment rate
plummeted between 1993 and 1997 by 43%, the decline in its Food Stamp
caseload was much smaller, 27%, and its TANF decline was only a little larger,
55%. In contrast, in most states during this period, TANF caseloads declined by
an average of twice the rate of state declines in unemployment (48% decline in
TANF cases compared to 24% decline in unemployment); and Food Stamp
caseload declines averaged about the same as declines in unemployment not
much smaller in magnitude as in Michigan.
Michigan, however, is not a typical state. Most states and localities are less
accommodating to families who would benefit from combining earnings and
welfare. Wisconsin, for instance, institutionalizes caseload decline as the major
and overriding goal. Mothers who apply for benefits and are deemed to be
employable may not receive cash assistance. They may receive Food Stamps,
child care, Medicaid, case management and job services; but the only cash they
get is what they earn, and they are not considered to be "cases" under Wisconsin
Works counting rules.
Wisconsin is also an unusual state. Most of the evidence suggests that more
states are like Wisconsin-which stresses work and not welfare-than Michigan
in their operations and basic orientations. This emphasis is not always explicit or
obvious. But several factors tend to discourage families from combining earnings
and cash or other forms of assistance for extended periods of time. First the new
welfare processes are much more complex and burdensome for families who
want to get and keep assistance, and the effect is to discourage families who can
avoid welfare from relying on it. This is, of course, precisely the signal that many
states and localities want to generate: welfare should be a last resort. The result is
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that despite the many new services available to families on TANF assistance, as
well as the increased generosity of state income and asset disregards-the real
"carrots" of welfare reforn--the administration of the laws tends to discourage
many working families from enjoying these benefits.60 The complexity comes,
in part, from the front-loading of various job search, program orientation, child
support, and other requirements, before assistance is actually obtained; and in
part, from all of the work participation requirements that are central to the new
goals of welfare.
Yet that is just the beginning. There is strong evidence in many states and
localities that the new work-related processes are not replacing, but being added
onto the older "quality control" emphasis on minimizing errors in determining
eligibility. In a related study of front-line practices in local welfare offices,
Professor Irene Lurie reported preliminary evidence that, based on direct
observations of interactions between families and front-line welfare workers,
eligibility determination processes are just as complicated and lengthy as
before-and in some cases, the processes are even more burdensome.61 In the
first round of research for the Rockefeller Institute's study, we also found that a
majority of the states in our sample had not yet made significant changes in their
quality control programs-programs which traditionally emphasized extensive
documentation of income and income changes and tended to treat earnings as a
source of fraud rather than a program mission. This was surprising because the
Personal Responsibility Act did not continue the federal government's oversight
of the states' quality control. However, some states are still very concerned with
the potential for fraud and abuse; and some reported that they still feel pressure
from the federal government to minimize eligibility errors in the Food Stamp
program, which in some cases is handled by the same personnel who review
clients for TANF assistance. Many local offices require frequent reporting of
hours worked and earnings received, especially of changes. We also found that a
quarter of the local welfare sites for which we obtained data required re-
certifications of twenty percent or more of active cases, every month. Finally, in
a few states, home visits have been revived, which create a level of intrusiveness
60 For information on the greater potential gains from earnings under state welfare
reforms, see generally GREGORY ACS Er AL., DOES WORK PAY? AN ANALYSIS OF THE WORK
INCENTIVES UNDER TANF (1998).
6 1 See Irene Lurie, State Capacity Study: Implementing PRWORA at the Local Level,
Address at the 1999 Welfare Reform Evaluation Conference Sponsored by the Administration
for Children and Families, Office of Planning, Research, and Evaluation, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (USDHHS) (May 12, 1999). Professors Norma Riccucci and
Marcia Meyers are also senior investigators in this study, which is funded by a grant from the
USDHHS.
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that some clients are happy to avoid.62 Elaborate work-related processes and
requirements, explicit attempts to divert families from welfare, continuing
emphasis on minimizing eligibility errors, and frequent reporting and re-
certification requirements all combine to make the new welfare a hassle, as well
as a helping hand.63
The new emphasis, in many states, on securing child support orders for
families on welfare rolls may also have the effect of discouraging families from
continuing to receive cash assistance. The Personal Responsibility Act frees
states to decide how to distribute the money they collect through child support
enforcement. Nearly all states refuse to let families have all or most of the child
support while the family receives cash assistance, thereby strongly encouraging
families with support to get off of welfare. Twenty-nine states do not pass along
any of the child support received. Eighteen states pass through $50 per month-
the amount they were required by the federal government to pass through under
AFDC-though in four of those states, the pass-through is only temporary. One
state, Kansas, passes through a reduced amount, $40, while Connecticut and
Nevada increased the amount given to families, $100 and $75, respectively. Only
Wisconsin chose to pass through all child support.64
One consequence of the greater costs of getting and keeping TANF
assistance seems to be a dropping out of families where the potential gains are
small. In states where TANF benefits are low-mostly states in the South and
West-families have typically had to make do without much assistance. And
now that the processes are more burdensome, many may avoid getting benefits
altogether. Some patterns in the data suggest that this dynamic may be at work.
As Table 1 shows, among the states that showed the largest declines in
AFDC/rANF caseloads between 1994 and 1998, the average (mean) benefit
levels were relatively low, while states that showed smaller declines tended to
have higher benefits. The pattern seems to compound inequalities across states.
In higher benefit states, families are more likely to get or stay on the rolls, even if
they are working and combine earnings and assistance. In lower benefit states,
families may be avoiding assistance, even when they qualify for it unless they
have no other option-and are thus even less likely than families in other states
to combine earnings and welfare.
62 See NATHAN & GAIS, supra note 40, at 30.
63 Professor Irene Lurie deserves much of the credit in identifying this "hassle' factor.
See generally Lurie, supra note 61.
64 See JEOME GALLAGHER ET AL., ONE YEAR AFrER FEDERAL WELFARE REFORM: A
DEsCRIPTION OF STATE TEMPORARY AssISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF), DECISIONs AS
oF OCrOBER 1997, at 41-42 (1998).
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Table 1. Average AFDC/TANF Maximum Benefits in States By Level of Caseload
Decline Between 1994 and 1998. (N = 51)
'guubL qLUi1 ' 1"70 LU Z-L1.-0 Oi.
Fourth quintile -23% to -38% $409
Third quintile -39% to -43% $371
Second quintile -44% to -49% $329
Lowest quintile -50% to -82% $309
While these factors may inhibit families from combining earnings and cash
assistance, other factors may prevent families from adding support from other
programs, such as Food Stamps and Medicaid. In fact, there has been an
uncoupling of the previously strong administrative connections between AFDC,
on the one hand, and Food Stamps and Medicaid, on the other.65 This
uncoupling was intended as a pro-work measure, as federal legislators wanted to
reduce incentives for families to stay on welfare simply in order to retain in-kind
benefits. However, the disconnects go beyond these intended breaks. Sometimes
they grow out of the greater administrative flexibility under TANF than under
Food Stamps or Medicaid. While TANF services and eligibility determinations
may be increasingly carried out by private organizations and employment or
labor bureaucracies, eligibility determinations for entitlements must still be under
the jurisdiction of health and social service agencies. The new up-front activities
and burdensome procedures may also, in some cases, have the effect of creating
new obstacles to getting benefits. Families may either not bother coming into
welfare offices or may leave the process before getting cash assistance. But even
if they have or get a job, they may still qualify for Food Stamps, Medicaid, or
child care assistance; and yet many of these families may not get information
about these programs and their availability to working families.66 Also, welfare
65 On changes in the Food Stamp program and its importance in the post-reform world,
see generally CRAIG GUNDERSEN ET AL., FOOD & RURAL ECON. Div., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
AGRICULTURAL ECON. REPORT NO. 773, THE CHANGING FOOD ASSISTANCE LANDSCAPE: THE
FOOD STAMP PROGRAM IN A POST-WELFARE REFORM ENVIRONMENT, (1999). On Medicaid
and welfare reform, see generally Frank J. Thompson & Richard P. Nathan, The Relationship
Between Welfare Reform and Medicaid: A Preliminary View, (unpublished manuscript
prepared for the National Health Policy Forum, on file with authors) (1999).
66 For a discussion of the "take-up" problem for Medicaid, see generally Thompson &
Nathan, supra note 65.
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information systems for TANF may no longer have the close connections with
entitlement programs that they enjoyed under AFDC, as these systems have had
to be redesigned to meet the time-limited and work-related demands of welfare
reform. Interestingly, our reports on local welfare offices indicate that many of
the new front-line case managers who are having the greatest problems in
adapting to their new responsibilities are those that come from employment
services backgrounds, as they must now deal with complex eligibility
requirements and may thus make frequent mistakes.
Similar administrative disconnects may also cause families not to receive the
child care assistance for which they are eligible. Many states are encountering
administrative glitches that prevent families from getting the care they need. In
Wisconsin, one reason for the fact that many child care resources are not being
used is the administrative slippage between W-2 agencies and the Milwaukee
County Social Services Department. W-2 agencies assess eligibility for child
care assistance, but county social service agencies certify child care providers,
set reimbursement rates, and reimburse providers-partly in response to scandals
about improper reimbursements and providers with criminal backgrounds. Their
slowness has caused some providers to refuse care to W-2 recipients.67 Many
states have reported a variety of other administrative problems in coordinating
welfare and child care functions. Even though states seem to be making some
progress in creating stronger linkages between their welfare eligibility systems
and their employment services, child care services are often not very well
integrated, and clients often run into problems.
The result of these management and administrative forces are real limits in
the implementation of the resources theory. Although it is true that the new
signals and services may be enough to increase earnings for some families, most
of the evidence from previous evaluations suggests that total income is not likely
to increase for most families unless they can combine their greater earnings with
at least some cash or in-kind assistance (i.e., over and above the assistance
needed to absorb the costs of working, such as child care and transportation). 68 It
67 See generally Thomas Kaplan, Management and Implementation of Wisconsin's W-2
Program, in THE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF GOV'T, MANAGING WELFARE REFORM:
UPDATES FROM FIELD RESEARCH IN FIVE STATES (1999).
68 See generally BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 19; BLANK, supra note 23; EDIN & LEIN,
supra note 23. One recent example is the evaluation of the New Hope project in Milwaukee.
This welfare reform project-which involved extensive services, generous disregards, an
earnings supplement, and work requirements--was widely interpreted as successful in part
because of its moderate impact on earnings, especially for families that were not initially
employed. Yet the estimated increase in earnings would not have come close to compensating
for the loss of income if the families had lost their Food Stamps, AFDC, or their "earnings
supplement." Thus, any program-induced increase in overall income due to greater earnings
depended on the continued receipt of public assistance. See HANS BOTH ET. AL., NEW HOPE
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is true that the federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) provides considerable
help in supplementing earnings, but that may not be enough to compensate for
declines in the receipt of cash assistance, Food Stamps, Medicaid, and other
benefits affected by the new and more complicated management processes and
structures.
69
IV. STATE WELFARE PROGRAMS AND THE ENVIRONMENT THEORY
While the Personal Responsibility Act encompasses three major theories of
how children could benefit from welfare reform, only one of these theories is
widely implemented. Most of the effects on children must come through the
environment model, since it is clear that work and work-like activities are
strongly promoted and facilitated, whether or not they result in increased overall
income. Yet this model depends on several strong assumptions. It assumes that
work by the head of household will make for a more structured, orderly life at
home, not a chaotic or stressful one; it assumes that a working parent is a better
parent, one who feels greater control over her life, greater independence, and a
greater competence that carries over into her family roles; and it assumes that
children will be well taken care of in reasonably safe and nurturing child care
centers and other facilities. Moreover, the model depends on other factors
besides the employment of the mother, including the psychological health of the
mother, characteristics of the family's interactions with one another, and the
quality of available child care in the local area.
Whether or not this model is correct, it is nonetheless untested, and states are
not collecting the information they need to examine even the simplest aspects of
the model. Our study of welfare information systems and their capacities show
that states are collecting and reporting very little information about children's
environments or the potential factors that affect how well the environment theory
works. States know very little about child care arrangements or needs among
families on welfare. In the Rockefeller Institute's field research questionnaire, a
large number of questions were posed that we considered to be important in
implementing welfare reform, yet many of the questions dealing with children
were the ones that states were least able to answer.70 Welfare information
systems were found to be good at keeping track of the basic status of welfare
cases: how many applications were filed, how many were approved, how many
FOR PEOPLE wrm Low INCOMEs: TWO-YEAR REsULTS OF A PROGRAM TO REDUCE POVERTY
AND REFORM WELFARE 16, tbl.5 (1999).
69 See generally Richard Bavier, An Early Look at the Effects of Welfare Reform
(Mar. 20, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Richard Bavier is an analyst at
the U.S. Office of Management and Budget
70 See NATHAN & GAIS, supra note 40, at 56-57.
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cases were active at a particular site, and to a lesser degree, how many were
assigned to a work activity and how many were actually working. But; very few
state information systems could report on whether families lacked child care (and
are thus exempt from work requirements), or how long they had been waiting for
child care services.7 ' Nor do states capture much information about children and
their home environments in their "tracking studies," which constitute most of
what passes as evaluation in the post-AFDC world; these studies focus on adult
employment behavior and the capacity of families to stay off the welfare rolls.72
Lacking even basic information about children and where they spend their days,
states do not have the means to examine more complicated questions about work
conditions, family dynamics, and child development-factors that are central to
the environment theory of child well-being.73 These problems are compounded
by second-order devolution, the decentralization of programs within states down
to local welfare offices or systems. While state-level data on child well-being and
some of these intermediate conditions may be obtainable, though at substantial
cost; collecting information on these connections in each locality is certainly a
formidable problem.74
Relying on a single theory may itself be problematic, as even the best
theories fail to work in many cases. Yet implementing the other two models is
not easy. The continuing political struggles over sexuality, and especially teen
sexuality, may make it hard for many states to construct strong coalitions in
favor of any concrete approach to the problems of teen and out-of-wedlock
births. Though the resources theory may have straightforward causal linkages
between its proximate and ultimate objectives-that is, increasing families'
material resources will improve child well-being--putting the theory into effect
7 1 See id.
72 For an overview of tracking studies, see generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/HEHs-99-48, WELFARE REFORM: INFORMATION ON FORMER REciPIENTs' STATUS, (1999).
73 There are also obvious privacy questions about collecting these sorts of data. Child
Trends' excellent publication, Children and Welfare Reform: A Guide to Evaluating the Effects
of State Welfare Policies on Children, suggests that states might want to analyze these causal
connections to child well-being using a variety of measures, including teacher surveys, in-
home surveys and direct observations, and direct child assessments. CHILDREN AND WELFARE
REFORM: A GUIDE TO EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF STATE WELFARE POLICIES ON CHILDREn
(1999). That approach may help address the "black box" character of the current way in which
the environment theory is implemented, but it is intrusive and expensive.
74 Data on child poverty by state is often averaged over several years to obtain reasonably
good estimates. See generally JIALI Li & NEIL G. BENNETr, YOUNG CHELDREN IN POvERTY:
A STATISTICAL UPDATE (1998) (using five-year averages to get good estimates of child poverty
at the state level). The U.S. Census Bureau estimates county level poverty rates for children or
young people in its Small Area and Poverty Estimates program, but the latest data available in
the fall of 1999 are for income in 1995, and the errors in the estimates are quite large.
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poses hard administrative problems in the context of work first Finding ways to
satisfy concerns about quality control without over-burdening working parents
may require enormous creativity. Most of all, however, the resources theory
demands good management at the level of social service systems, not just at the
TANF or program level. Increasing family resources in a significant way may
require greater connectivity between difficult-to-reconcile social program
principles: work first, which is largely represented in state and local TANF
systems; and entitlements, which are still well represented in the Food Stamp and
Medicaid programs. The tensions between the administration and operation of
these basic principles are real, and they can easily lead to mutual disruption and
even deterioration. The signaling and institutional realignments used to
implement work first may undermine access to entitlements. But given the kinds
of jobs that most welfare recipients are moving into, we may not be able to
expect major increases in family resources unless all three systems are
reconciled. Most states still seem to be some distance from meeting these
management challenges; and as a result, children will have to depend on the
success of a policy theory-the environment theory-whose ultimate
connections with child well-being are more assumed than observed, and
probably not very well understood.
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